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Summary findings
There is increasing  concern  among  policymakers  that  existing  evidence  is mixed. Several  studies  have  found
social  security  reforms  that involve  a transition  to  that the share of the Chilean  workforce  covered  by the
individual  retirement  savings  accounts  may  exclude  national  pension system  has increased  since individual
certain  groups  of workers from coverage  against  the risk  retirement  accounts  were installed  in 1981; others have
of poverty  in old age. While  most public  pay-as-you-go  shown  that there has been  no change  in this share. But
systems  pool the risk  of interrupted careers  and periods  these studies  rely on simulations  or on casual  observation
of low  earnings  over the covered  population,  the  of data on the sectoral  allocation  of the labor force  and
reformed  systems  shift the burden of these risks  to the  relate only  to Chile.  Sufficient  time has  now passed  since
individual.  Adequate  coverage  under a system  of  reforms  in several  Latin  American  countries  to allow
individual  retirement  accounts  depends  critically  on  more  rigorous  testing of the theory.
accumulating  sufficient  savings  through regular  Packard  estimates  the impact  of social  security
contributions.  reform-specifically,  the transition  from a purely  public
In developing  countries  where  opportunities  for  pay-as-you-go  system  to one with private  individual
unregulated  employment  abound and workers  can easily  retirement  accounts-on the share of the workforce  that
escape  mandated  social  insurance,  theory suggests  that  contributes  to formal  retirement security  systems.  To test
reforms  will increase  the number  of contributors  to  the predictions  of a simple  model of a segmented  labor
social  security  by reducing  distortions  and improving  market,  he exploits  variation  in data from a panel  of 18
incentives  in the labor market. Motivated  primarily  by  Latin  American  countries,  observed  from 1980 to 1999.
fiscal  pressures  stemming  from the deficits  of overly  Results  show that introducing  individual  retirement
generous,  poorly administered  public  pension systems,  accounts  has  a positive  incentive  effect  that, other thliIugs
many  governments  are going ahead  with reforms  as if  equal,  increases  the share of the economically  active
this theory is correct.  population  contributing  to the reformed  system.  But this
Does  a shift  to individual  retirement  accounts  improve  effect  occurs  only gradually  as employers  and workers
the incentives  to contribute  to social  security?  Almost  a  become  familiar  with the new set of social  security
decade  after reforms  to national social  security  systems  in  institutions  put in place by reform.
Latin  America  (two decades,  in the case  of Chile),
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There is increasing concern among policy makers that social security reforms that involve
a  transition to  individual retirement savings accounts, may exclude certain groups of
workers from coverage against the risk of poverty in old age.  While most public pay-as-
you-go  (PAYGO)  systems pool  the risk  of  interrupted careers  and  periods  of  low
earnings over the covered population, the reformed systems shift the burden of these risks
onto the individual. Adequate coverage under a system of individual retirement accounts
depends critically on accumulating sufficient savings through regular contribution.  In
developing  countries  where  opportunities  for  unregulated employment  abound  and
workers can easily escape mandated social insurance, theory suggests that reforms will
increase  the  number  of  contributors to  social security  by  reducing  distortions and
improving incentives  in  the  labor market.  Motivated primarily by  fiscal  pressures
brought by the deficits of overly generous, poorly administered public pension systems,
many governments are going ahead with reforms as if this theory is correct.
Does a  shift to individual retirement accounts improve the incentives to  contribute to
social security?  Can  governments that partially privatize retirement security systems
expect an increase in the number of workers who contribute?  Almost a decade - in the
case of Chile, two decades - after reforms to national social security systems in Latin
America, existing evidence in  the literature is mixed.  Corsetti and  Schmidt-Hebbel,
(1994), and Schmidt-Hebbel (1998) find evidence that there has been an increase in the
share of the workforce covered by the national pension system since individual retirement
accounts where installed in Chile in 1981. However, Edwards and Edwards (2000) find
that  in  1997, only  62% of the labor force in Chile was contributing to the reformed
national system - about the  same share of  workers who contributed to  the  PAYGO
system prior to reform.  Cortazar (1997) and Arenas de Mesa (2000) similarly find no
change in the portion of contributing workers.  However, the findings of these studies
rely either on simulations or casual observation of the available data on sector allocation
of the labor force and relate only to Chile.  Sufficient time has now passed since reforms
in several Latin American countries to allow for more rigorous testing of the theory.
This paper tests the implications of a simple model developed by Edwards and Edwards
(2000) of a  labor market undergoing a transition away from a purely PAYGO social
security system to one with individual retirement accounts. The objective of the paper is
to  estimate the  impact  of  these  reforms  that  were  intended to  lower  labor market
distortions and correct incentives at the aggregate level.  To do this, I exploit variation in
the data from a panel of eighteen Latin American countries over the 1980's and 1990's,
of  which  seven  have  undergone  the  transition  to  a  national  system  of  individual
retirement accounts. 1 The next section provides a brief background on social security
reform in Latin America.  Section III reviews the relevant literature on the impact of
reforms  on  the  labor  market,  and  presents  the  model.  Section  IV  discusses  the
methodology, the data used in the estimation, and the hypotheses that are tested.  Section
V  presents  the  results  of  regressions using  pooled  OLS, fixed  and  random effects
estimators, and discusses the robustness of these findings. Section VI concludes.
2II.  Social Security Reform in Latin America
Among  developing  regions,  Latin  America  has  a  relatively  long  tradition  of
institutionalized  social  security.  Governments at  various  levels,  unions  and  trade
associations have been administering retirement, disability and survivor insurance - and
in  some  cases  unemployment insurance - since the  early  1900s.  Despite this  long
tradition,  a  substantial portion  of the working population remains outside of  formal
systems, relying on other market and non-market forms of protection from shocks to their
income.  However,  demographic and  economic forces  are  putting both  formal  and
informal institutions under strain, making it increasingly difficult for families to care for
their elderly on their own, and for governments to deliver on the promises made to those
who accumulated rights toward formal income protection in old age.
As  in  other regions,  Latin America's  population is aging.  Although the pace of the
demographic transition  varies widely,  from relatively  "young"  countries such  as El
Salvador, to relatively  "old" countries such as Uruguay, falling fertility rates combined
with lengthening life expectancy are increasing the portion of the population in old age
and shrinking the number of new entrants into the labor force (ECLAC,  1998).  This
transition has been accompanied by liberalization of product and financial markets and
greater integration with the world economy.  Structural adjustment after the debt crisis in
the  1980s and the need for greater efficiency as countries opened their economies to
competition from abroad in the 1990s, has led to a steady reallocation of the labor force.
Changes in the relative size of different branches of the economy show a clear increase in
the  number  of  workers  employed  in  small  firms,  temporarily  employed  and  self
employed, and a fall in the number working in large firms and in the public sector (ILO,
1998).  Growth in the share of elderly, and the push for greater efficiency, have forced
governments to restructure labor market institutions to accommodate these trends.
[See Figures  1 and 2. Demographic  Trends  from 1975  - 2050  & Sector  Allocation  of Labor  from
1980  - 1997,  in Latin America]
The most radical labor market adjustments in the region in the last twenty years have
been the series of reforms of social security initiated by Chile in  1981, and followed in
the 1990s by Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Bolivia, El Salvador and
Nicaragua (see Table 1).  These reforms usually involve a transition away from purelv
public  systems - similar to  those  administered in Europe and  the United States and
financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis - to  systems with "multiple pillars".  In
multi-pillar systems the bulk of retirement income is financed from mandated savings in
individual retirement accounts. These funds are invested in bonds and equities by private
pension fund managers, and the role of the state is reduced to guaranteeing a minimum
threshold income to keep individuals from falling into poverty in old age.
Reforms in the region have been controversial. The proponents of the multi-pillar reform
model argue that the new institutions increase the efficiency of the labor market.  The
principal  advantage of  individual retirement  accounts  is  that  - at  least  in  theory  -
eligibility is  extended to  all  labor force participants regardless of where  they work,
' While data are also available for Colombia, they are suspect and have thus been removed from the panel.
See discussion of the data, in section IV.b.
3erasing the  "formal/informal" distinction at least as  it pertains to  retirement  income
security.  By tightening the link between contributions and retirement benefits, reforms
that  introduce  individual retirement accounts cut the  pure-tax component  of payroll
deductions, reduce the cost of hiring incurred by employers, discourage early retirement
of experienced workers, and increase the flexibility and cross-sector movement of labor
(World Bank, 1994, James 1996, James, 1997). Detractors argue that since they involve
little if any redistribution between generations or between high and low-earning workers
of the same generation, systems based primarily on individual retirement accounts lead to
greater social inequity.  PAYGO systems that usually pay benefits according to a defined
formula, pool the risk of interrupted careers and periods of low earnings over the covered
population, while the new systems shift the burden of these risks onto the individual
(Diamond, 1998, Queisser, 1998).  The new systems are further criticized for imposing
high administrative costs (Diamond, 1993), and exposing workers' retirement security to
the relative volatility of financial markets.  Finally, contrary to the efficiency benefits
touted by reform advocates, critics argue that it is unclear whether individual retirement
accounts have made the labor market more or less efficient (Diamond, 1998).
Theory suggests that a transition away from a purely public, PAYGO regime and toward
individual retirement accounts will effect the labor market through two channels.  First,
reforms can often entail a reduction in the payroll tax rate which reduces the cost of labor
and/or increases net wages, encouraging greater participation in the labor market and the
creation of regulated employment (Cowell, 1985).  Second, systems based on individual
retirement  accounts  tie  benefits  directly  to  contributions,  reducing  the  portion  of
mandated contributions that  are perceived as a pure tax (World Bank,  1994).  These
claims point to  a shift in the incentives faced by firms and workers in their resource
allocation decisions following a  reform, as mandated contributions are more  directly
linked to future benefits.  This shift in incentives is important to the extent that workers
who may have evaded  coverage in the past,  choose to  participate in  national  social
security systems after reforms.
IIL. The Transition to Individual Retirement Accounts: A Two Sector Model
In most developing countries only a small share of workers sell their labor in a regulated,
"formal" sector, subject to a mandated minimum wage and covered by a social security
system.  The remainder work in an  unregulated, uncovered, "informal"  sector where
wages are determined by the market and workers and employers escape the mandate to
contribute to  social security.  A  country's  social  security institutions can  affect  the
allocation of labor between the sectors.  Social security contributions are one of the main
components of non-wage labor costs, thus "informalizing" production allows firms to
reduce their costs.  In Latin America, the costs imposed by social security are estimated
to be as high as 20% of the operating expenses of small firms (Tokman 1992, Tokman
and Martinez, 1999).
Theory suggests that, at the margin, a higher contribution rate for social security distorts
labor allocation if workers do not consider their contributions "appropriable" in the future
at the  market rate  of interest (Corsetti, 1994, Schmidt-Hebbel, 1998). When the  link
between mandated contributions and perceived benefits  is ambiguous, social  security
4imposes a tax on labor (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, Summers, 1989).  In the case of
public pensions where the pay-off to workers' "investment" in the system lies far in the
future, this perceived tax can be even more onerous if discount rates are high and access
to credit is constrained (Samwick, 1997, James, 1999). Additionally, in many developing
countries, public institutions like social security lack credibility - workers may heavily
discount that they will receive a  pension at all - further increasing the perceived tax
burden of current contributions (James, 1996).
Several  authors  have  shown  that  the  extent  of  distortion  to  the  labor  market  is
independent of whether a  country opts for a purely public PAYGO system or  one of
private individual retirement accounts (Diamond, 1998, Barr,  1998, Thompson,  1999,
Barr,  2000).  Corsetti  (1994)  finds  that  to  the  extent  that  workers  link  current
contributions  to  future  pension  benefits  at  the  margin,  labor  market  distortions
determining the  size of the informal sector are not necessarily lower  in a  system  of
individual retirement accounts.  Once contributions and benefits are actuarially linked,
income incentives to work in the formal sector can be higher under a PAYGO regime
than in a fully-funded system.  Orzag and Stiglitz (1999) and Barr (2000) present similar
arguments.  This said, Corsetti acknowledges that while the link between contributions
and future benefits is unambiguous in a system of individual retirement accounts, such
actuarial balance must be  carefully built in to the design of the benefit  formula of a
PAYGO system.  James (1997)  stresses this  point, showing that  rarely do  PAYGO
formulas clearly link benefits to contributions, and if they do the balance is frequently
upset by demographic and political pressures, especially in developing countries.  Rather
than enter into this debate, I focus on measuring the impact of reforms in Latin America,
that were expected to lower labor market distortions and improve workers' incentives to
contribute.
Below, I use a simple model of a segmented labor market developed by Edwards and
Edwards (2000) for Chile, along the lines of the traditional Harris and Todaro (1970)
class of migration models, as a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis in later
sections.  The Harris and Todaro class of models characterize informal employment not
as a choice, but as a residual sector where workers who have either lost their jobs or
recently migrated from rural areas bide their time queuing for waged employment in
modem firms.  This view has been widely challenged in the theoretical and empiric.al
literature (Tokman, 1992, Yamada, 1996, Packard, 1997, Maloney, 1999).  However the
assumption that sorting into formal and informal jobs is determined exogenously by the
wedge  between wages in the two  sectors imposed by payroll taxes,  is convenient to
testing  for  aggregate incentive  effects in  response to  institutional  changes to  social
security that lower the wedge.  The assumption is relaxed in later chapters of this thesis.
To keep the model simple, Edwards and Edwards (2000) further assume that, other things
equal, workers would rather be employed in the covered sector where  wages are on-
average higher, and income is subject to less variation. 2 However, jobs in this sector are
rationed. In equilibrium the wage rate obtained in the uncovered sector is equal to the
expected net wage in the covered sector. As in Harris and Todaro (1970), employment in
2 The  authors  assume  workers  are risk  neutral,  but point  out  that assuming  constant  relative  risk  aversion
does not change  the model's  predictions.
5the covered sector turns over fully in every period, so that the probability of getting a job
there is equal to the ratio of job openings to job seekers. However, Edwards and Edwards
(2000) depart from the seminal model by assuming there is no migration - an appropriate
simplification when analyzing the already highly urbanized economies in Latin America.
Prior to reform of the social security system, workers in the covered sector are subject to
a pay-roll tax T that finances the benefits paid to current pensioners.  These benefits are
determined by a formula that has little relation to mandated contributions. Workers in the
covered sector receive a  legislated minimum wage Wmin,  making the cost of labor to
firms in the covered sector Wmin  + T.  The social security reform will reduce this tax by:
(i) reducing the actual mandated contribution rate; and (ii) tying pension benefits strictly
to workers' contributions in a system of individual retirement savings accounts.  While
differences  in  rates  of  time  preference keep  the  transition  to  individual retirement
accounts  from  completely  eliminating  the  perceived  tax  component  of  mandated
contributions (Torche and Wagner, 1997, James 1999, Holzmann, Packard and Cuesta,
2000) a share of these contributions will be considered fully-owned savings.
In equilibrium the wage rate in the uncovered sector Wn is equal to the expected wage
rate in the covered sector W,.  However, since jobs in the covered sector are rationed, the
expected wage rate is weighted by the probability of getting a job, p.  Assuming that the
unemployed obtain earnings equal to S, and that the probability of finding a job in the
covered sector is equal to the ratio of openings (employment in the covered sector, LJ) to
applicants (the sum of employment plus the total number of unemployed (Lc + U), in
equilibrium
=  Wn  c  (1)
Wc = p  Wmin + (-p)  S  (2)
p = [Lc/(Lc  + U]  (3)
where U is the number of unemployed and the ratio [LC/(Lc  + U)] is the probability of
finding employment in the covered sector.  Substituting (3) into (2), and assuming that
the unemployed have zero earnings (S = 0), the initial equilibrium wage in the uncovered
sector is
Wn  = [LC/(Lc  + U)] Wmjn  (4)
The total labor force, F,  is equal to the sum of employment in the covered and uncovered
sectors, and the stock of unemployed.
Lc +  L, + U = F  (5)
Firms  maximize  profits,  and  their  demand  for  labor  in  each  sector  (covered  and
uncovered) depends on wages, Wc and  W,  and product prices, Pc and  Pn,  respectively.
Lc  = f(Wc,  PC)  (6)
L.  =  g(Wn,  Pn)
6The impact of the reduction of the pay-roll tax on wages in the uncovered sector will be
dlogW = (1/A) [U/(L + U))  77, (U/F)  + (La/F)  17  L (U/(Lc+ U))] (T/1 + T)) dlog T  (7)
where 17 is the demand elasticity of labor in the covered sector, 17 is  the demand
elasticity for labor in the uncovered sector and
A = [(U/F) - (L,/F)  177  (U/(L, + U)] > 0  (8)
The right hand side of equation (7) is negative, indicating that reductions in the tax on
labor in the covered sector (d log T < 0) will always result in an increase in the clearing
wage rate for those workers not covered by the social security system.  Edwards and
Edwards (2000)  are  careful to  point  out  that  the effects of  reform on  the  level  of
unemployment are not clear.  This will depend on the extent of the reduction in the tax
component of social security contributions, as well as on the elasticities of demand for
labor in the covered and uncovered sectors.
The comparative  statics of the transition to  individual accounts are demonstrated  in
Figure 3.  Prior to reform the curve yy satisfies the wage-rate equilibrium. OCLco  people
are employed in the covered sector, O'L'o  are employed in the uncovered sector, and
L'oLCo  are unemployed. Wmin  is the net-minimum wage.  The pre-reform pay-roll tax for
social security is To, and Wo is the equilibrium wage rate in the uncovered sector, where
yy intersects with the labor demand schedule in the uncovered sector L(N). The expected
wage of those employed in the uncovered sector and for the unemployed that make up the
rest of the queue of applicants for covered jobs, is equal to W0. We retain the authors'
assumption that non-labor factors of production are sector-specific, and that labor supply
is inelastic.
[See Figure 3. Lowering  Tax Component  of Payroll  Contributions  & Sector Allocation  of Labor
Force - Comparative Statics]
The new pay-roll tax rate after the reform is T,.  The reduction in the payroll tax lowers
the cost of covered employment and the number of jobs in the covered sector increases to
Lc 1. Wages in the uncovered sector rise to WI, where the new wage rate equilibrium
schedule y'y'  intersects with L(N).  Thus, the number of jobs in the uncovered sector
falls to L'1. The Edwards and Edwards (2000) framework predicts that as the tax wedge
shrinks, covered employment will increase.
IV.a.  Methodology and Estimated Model
The specific questions of interest drawn from the theoretical framework are: does the size
of  the  wedge  created by  the  pay-roll  tax  for  social  security, lower  the  number  of
contributors in the work force? and does the share of pay-roll taxes accumulating in an
individual retirement account increase the number of contributors?  To  answer these
questions, I exploit cross-country and time series variability in the pay-roll tax for social
security - and more importantly, the institutional differences between countries that have
introduced private individual retirement accounts and those that still run a "single-pillar"
7PAYGO system  - to  estimate the impact of reforms intended to  lower labor market
distortions and improve incentives.  Drawing from the framework, I estimate a reduced
form model for changes in the size of the covered sector, proxied here by the portion of
the  labor  force  contributing to  the  national pension  system.  The  two-way  error
component model is written
C,, =a+  A X,,  +8 2AL,,  +  3Al0,  +/3 4IRA+ ,  +u,  (9)
where C is the number of contributors to the national social security system as a share of
the labor force, in country i in year t;  X is a vector of variables controlling for countries'
levels of economic development, and includes per capita income and life expectancy at
birth;  AL is a  vector of variables capturing cyclical and non-cyclical features of the
labor market, including the change in the rate of unemployment, 3 and the number of
women in labor force;  0  is the total rate of tax on pay-roll for all social insurance 4;  and
IRA is the share of  0) accumulating in an individual retirement account in countries that
have reformed. The hypotheses corresponding to the questions above are thus
Ceteris paribus...  Null  Alternative
1.  Does the size of the pay-roll tax for social security  H  /33  = 0  Hi  .83  < 0
lower the number of contributors in the work force?  °
2.  Does the share of pay-roll taxes accumulating in an  H  A4  = 0  Hi  . 84  > 0
individual retirement account increase the number  °
of contributors?
However,  the  model  presented  by  Edwards  and  Edwards  (2000)  is a  static  model  that
makes no specific predictions about the transition after reform.  Does the labor market
jump from pre to post-reform equilibrium, or are there post-reform transition dynamics in
the share of workers who contribute? Does the transition follow a particular pattern? To
estimate dynamic effects, I add the variable YR to the reduced form, so that
C,, =a±+81Xi,  +/J2 L,,  ±1330,,  8  + 4IRA  +T(YR)+£j  +u,  (10)
where  r  is a vector  of estimated  coefficients,  and  YR is the number  of years  that  have
passed after the  introduction of  individual retirement accounts.  We thus  add to  the
previous  set  of  hypotheses  with
Ceteris paribus...  Null  Alternative
3.  Are  there  post-reform  transition dynamics  in the  Ho  =0  H:  T ￿  0
share of contributors?  0
Readers  should note  that  I  use  the  difference in  the  rate  of  unemployment, and  not  the  level  of
unemployment in  the  reduced  form  model.  While the  Edwards and  Edwards  (2000)  framework is
ambiguous with respect to the impact of reforms on the level of unemployment, this may be determined
simultaneously with the shift of workers into the covered sector.
4 This normally includes retirement security and public health insurance.  In most countries this tax will
also cover  the  contributor against  the risk  to  income from  disability and  death (this  last, the  risk to
dependent household members from the loss of an income provider).
8IV.b.  The Data
The panel data set includes both middle-income and poorer countries in Latin America.
those  that have  introduced individual retirement accounts, and those  that  maintain  a
single-pillar, PAYGO system. The "reformers" in our sample are Chile, Peru, Argentina.
Uruguay,  Bolivia,  Mexico, and  El  Salvador.5  The  "non-reformers"  include  BraziL
Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala.
Jamaica, the Dominican Republic. 6 There are eighteen countries in the cross section.
The time period covered is from 1980 to 1999. The average number of observations per
country is  18, varying from 8 to  20. The variables used in the estimated model are
defined in Table 2.
Our variable of interest - the share of the economically active population contributing tc
a national social security system - is non-stationary (see plots in Figure 4.a.), as are some
of the independent variables, such as income per capita, the rate of unemployment and
the shares of women in the labor force.  However, the relatively short time  series (a
maximum of 20 years) does not permit the use of unit-root tests to determine whether the
non-stationarity is stochastic or deterministic.  Further, since all of the countries in the
sample  are  far  from  equilibrium,  I  found  that  controlling  for  non-stationarity  by
differencing or de-trending the variables, eliminated critical variation in the data.  For this
reason I control for year-specific effects in the model by including dummy variables for
every year in the time-series and fixed effects.
Readers will note that among the reformers only in Chile and Uruguay was there an
actual reduction in the absolute rate of payroll taxation for social insurance (see Figure
4.b.).  Brazil's pay-roll tax was also lowered, although not in the context of a structural
reform of social security.  In all other reforming countries the total rate of pay-roll tax -
often very low in relation to the benefits paid by the single pillar systems - was raised as
part of the reform packages.  However, in every reforming country, the perceived tax was
lowered by redirecting a portion of the total social insurance contribution to an individual
retirement  account.  Taking this  portion as a  measure of the  degree of privatization,
Chile's  reform was the deepest (51%), followed by Bolivia (42%), then Peru  and El
Salvador (both 33%), Colombia and  Mexico (30%), Uruguay (18.5%), and  the least
privatized, Argentina (16%) (see Figure 4.c . and Figure 5).
The data have other features that could affect the results.  In several of the reforming
countries, an active PAYGO system has been retained in one form or another (readers are
referred back to Table  1).7  For example, in Argentina workers have a one-off choice
whether to stay in a downsized PAYGO or to save in an individual account. In Colombia
5Colombia  was removed from the panel since the number of contributors may be overstated, for reasons
explained in later paragraphs.
6  Of the "non-reformers" proposals, and in some cases even draft legislation, exist to introduce mandated
individual retirement  accounts in all but Brazil  and Jamaica. Recent changes to the  retirement beneft
formula of the Regime Geral da Previdencia Social for Brazil's private sector workers, that effectively tied
benefits to contributions (although without a transition to individual accounts), are not covered by the data,
since these came into effect in early 2000.  Nicaragua and Costa Rica have passed legislation but the reform
takes effect after our time series.
' By "active" we mean that the PAYGO system still receives contributions, and is not phasing itself out by
paying benefits to the current stock of elderly.
9workers have the  same choice, however, they are allowed to  switch back  and forth
between the PAYGO and the individual accounts every three years.  In Uruguay, rather
than separate pillars, the system of retirement accounts is stacked onto the PAYGO in a
system of  "tiers"  where participation is determined by income level - that  is poorer
workers are only allowed to contribute to the public system, while workers earning above
a threshold contribute to both systems.  The active, parallel systems in many countries
make it difficult to keep track of where workers are contributing, posing the danger of
double counting contributors and overstating the dependent variable in a given year.8
Further, in Chile and Peru there are only poor records on contribution to the PAYGO
systems prior to reform, challenging attempts to assess the impact of the new regimes in
each country.  This said, the data in the panel are supported by Holzmann (1997) and
Arenas de Mesa (2000).  We return to these points and how they may effect our estimates
in the next section.
The variation in the sample comes from differences across countries and over time.  I
control for common, country-specific, unobservable effects that remain  constant over
time and that may affect both the dependent and the independent variables, by employing
fixed effects in the regressions reported below.  Regressions employing random effects
are also reported, however, these estimates may be  biased since the control variables
(such  as per  capita  income or  share of  women in  the  labor force) are likely  to  be
correlated with country error terms.  For this reason I estimate the basic model using
OLS, random effects and fixed effects, and test the suitability of the different estimators.
V. Results
Regression results are presented in Table 3.  The point estimates on the independent
variables vary between the pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects regressions.
The estimated coefficients on all of the control variables except the share of women in
the labor force, are significant in all three estimates. 9 The unexpected positive sign on
the coefficient of the social security tax variable indicates that all but the most general
specification - fixed effects - may be generating biased estimates.'0 An F test rejects the
OLS estimation at the 1% significance level in favor of country fixed effects.  However, a
Hausman specification (X2) test failed to reject the restrictions on the model imposed by
the random effects estimation.
Turning attention to the random and fixed effects estimators (in the last two columns of
to Table 3) we see that the coefficients on the control variables for level of development
(log of per-capita income, lgnppc, life expectancy at birth, lifeexpf) and changes in the
8 I am grateful to Hermann Von Gersdorff at World Bank for pointing out this danger, particularly in the
data from Colombia.
9 Women's participation in the labor force is positive and significant in the OLS estimation.
10  From theory we would expect the social security tax, sstax, variable to be negative, however, in the OLS
estimation the coefficient is positive and significant at 1%.  Since they do not control for country effects,
the  OLS coefficients on  sstax are  most  likely capturing the relatively higher number  of contributing
workers in countries where the population is relatively "older", and where social security systems have
been in place longer or matured, requiring higher rates of contribution (Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia,
Brazil) (James, 1997).
10labor  market  structure  (changes  in  the  rate  of  unemployment,  8 unemp,  female
participation, femlab) where significant, bear the expected signs.
As income per-capita rises so does the share of contributors to the social security system.
Higher  rates  of  life-expectancy  also  increase the  share  of  workers who  contribute.
Changes in the rate of unemployment capture cyclical effects, and show a fall in the share
of contributors as the number of people who find themselves without work rises. The
share of women in the labor force has no significant effect to the share of contributors in
either the random or fixed effects estimation. The dummies for the t - I years in the time
series, included to  control for time-specific effects but  omitted from Table 3, are all
significant at the 1% level in both estimations.
As expected from the theoretical discussion in Section II, the estimated coefficient on the
social security tax variable is negative and significant (at 10% using random effects, and
1% in  fixed effects).  In both the random and the fixed effects regressions the social
security tax  variable bears the largest coefficient in the equation.  The fixed effect3
coefficient on the variable measuring the extent of structural reform to social security,
[RA - the portion of the total payroll tax for social insurance accumulating in a privately
managed individual retirement account, rather than pooling in a public PAYGO system -
is positive and highly significant (at 5%). While the random effects coefficient on IRA is
not statistically significantly different from zero, it bears the expected sign.
Tro  capture a possible lag in the reaction of the labor market to reformns  - either because
of uncertainty due  to the dramatic changes they entail, or a learning effect as agents
became familiar with the set of new social security institutions - I experimented with
several different  polynomials on the years-since-reform variable, YR.  A third-order
polynomial was preferred by the data. The signs and size of the coefficients suggest a ".1
curve" effect in the share of workers contributing after a reform (in the random and the
fixed effects estimations, the coefficients on YR, YR 2 and YR 3 were all significant at
1%).11 A glance at the plotted dependent variable in Figure 4.a. also suggests such an
effect,  as  the  share  of  contributors initially dips  after the  introduction of  individual
retirement accounts, begins to rise in the second or third year, and then gradually levels.
Rteaders  will note that this effect is most pronounced in the Chile data.  Therefore, to test
whether the pattern of contribution was different after the reform in Chile than in other
reforming countries, I interacted a Chile dummy variable with each of the polynomial
terms and included these in both the random and fixed effects regressions.  Testing for
the joint significance of the coefficients on the Chile interacted variables, I was unable to
reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  these are  significantly different  from  zero  in  either
1 I experimented  with several alternatives  to estimate  transition  dynamics  after reforms, including  using
lags of the dependent variable and the policy (sstax and ira) variables.  The lagged variables where no-
significant in either random or fixed effects, both when the year since reform polynomials were left in the
regression and when they where removed.  With respect to sstax and ira, the insignificance of the lagged
terms may reflect the fact that for each country the variables changes only once, at the time of reform.
T  hus, in each case applying a lagg operator generates a variable that varies from the original variable for
only seven out of  287 observations.  Further, the relatively small size of the panel's  cross-section - 18
countries - dissuaded me from using a GMM (generalized method of moments) estimator, since this would
have introduced more biases to the model.
11regression. 12 That is to say, the J curve in the share of contributors in Chile  is not
different to that in any other reforming country in the years following the introduction of
individual retirement accounts.  The J curve is shown in Figure 6, as a plot of the fixed
effects coefficients on the years-since-reform  polynomials.
The  signs  and  significance  of  the  coefficients  in  both  random  and  fixed  effects
regressions are robust to changes in the model.  For example, since the IRA variable is
equal to zero in countries without a system of individual accounts, I was concerned that it
might act as a dummy variable for countries that have reformed, rather than measure the
degree of the shift to individual accounts between one reformer and another. I included a
reform dummy as a control, but this only increased the significance of the coefficients on
the  IRA and  social security tax variables.  Since the reform dummy captures  little
additional  information, and  in order  to  preserve degrees of  freedom, I  dropped  the
variable from the regressions. Additionally, concerned that these results might be driven
by double counting of contributors in reforming countries with parallel PAYGO systems,
I  dropped observations from Colombia - where because workers can switch between
regimes every three  years, the danger of double counting is highest - and re-ran the
regressions, removing the other reforming countries from the panel one by one.  The sign
and significance of the estimated coefficients remained robust to these changes. Keeping
in mind the weakness of the Hausman specification test, the fixed effects regression is
preferred.  13
Turning back to the hypotheses in Section III, these results are summarized as answers to
the questions raised. Does the size of the total pay-roll tax for social security lower the
number of contributors in the workforce? The negative and significant coefficient on the
social security tax variable suggests so.  Fiorito and Padrini (2001) arrive  at similar
results in an analysis of labor taxes in developed economies. Does the portion of pay-roll
tax for  social security accumulating in  an  individual retirement account  increase the
number of contributors? The greater the portion of payroll deductions that accumulates in
an individual retirement account, the larger the share of contributors in the work force.
Finally, is there evidence of transition dynamics in the number of contributors to social
security in the years after a reform? Our results suggest that the drop in contributors in
the first years after a new system is introduced - that may reflect uncertainty arising from
sudden, dramatic change in the "rules of the game" - is followed by a gradual rise, as
agents become familiar with the new  retirement security instrument.  Evidence of  a
similar  "uncertainty"  effect  inhibiting  workers  from  saving  in  the  new  individual
retirement accounts, is found by Barr and Packard (2000).  The size of the estimated
coefficients suggest that the positive effect on the number of contributors in the work
force from the share of the payroll tax accumulating in an individual retirement account,
is greater than the dynamic effects in the years after reform.
12 Random effects, X2(3)  = 0.77, Prob. >  2  =  0.8559;  fixed effects, F (3, 238) = 0.44, Prob > F = 0.728
13 I would like to thank Steve Bond at Nuffield College for pointing out the flaws in the Hausman
specification test.
12V.  Conclusions
There  is  increasing concern in  countries where single-pillar PAYGO  social security
systems  have  been replaced  by  private  individual retirement  accounts,  that  a  large
number of workers will be excluded from coverage.  Whereas PAYGO  systems pay
benefits according to  a  defined formula and pool the risk of  interrupted careers and
periods of low earnings over the covered population, the new systems shift the burden of
these  risks  onto  the  individual.  Therefore,  adequate coverage  under  a  system  of
individual retirement  accounts  depends  critically on  accumulating sufficient  savings
through regular contribution.  Reforms are expected to increase regular contribution by
eliminating distortions and improving incentives in the labor market.
In this paper I have estimated the impact of a transition from a single-pillar PAYCGO
system to  one with individual retirement accounts, on the share of the workforce flhat
contributes to social security.  Using a theoretical framework developed by Edwards and
Edwards (2000), I exploit variation in data from a panel of eighteen Latin Ameri.an
countries to test the implication of the simple model.  The results show evidence (o. a
positive incentive effect  after the introduction of  individual retirement  accounts iliat
increases the share of the economically active population who contribute to the reforrmed
system.  However, this takes place only gradually.  Employers and workers may n2ed
time to overcome uncertainty, and become familiar with the set of new social secu-ity
institutions that reforms put  in place.  While these results cannot be used to  deny the
expected improvement  in  incentives that  may  arise from  aligning  contributions  and
benefits within a PAYGO system - as with the establishment of "notional"  defined-
contribution retirement accounts (NDCs) in several countries - they do  indicate thiat
workers  respond  to  improvements  in  individual incentives  to  contribute  to  forinnal
retirement security system.
Do  these results  indicate  that  policy  makers in  countries  that  introduce  individual
retirement accounts have nothing to worry about? The relatively low numbers of workers
who contribute to  formal retirement security systems in the Latin America - even in
countries that have undertaken reforms - provide the best argument against complacency.
Further, the low share of regular contributors in reformed systems - in Chile averag.ng
50%, and in Argentina as low as 39% in 1999 - indicate that the wedge created by the
payroll tax is just  one of many possible barriers separating certain groups of workers
from formal protection. This said, since the data on contribution to social security ignore
other forms of insurance and savings that individuals and households make engage in on
their own, they may over-state the degree of vulnerability to the risk of poverty in old
age, and should not be a cause of undue panic.
The results reported in this paper, indicate that agents respond to changes in labor market
incentives. However, while elimination of the pure-tax component of payroll deductionls
may be a necessary condition to increase the level of regular contribution, it may not be
sufficient.  Coverage under a formal social security system is often nested deeply witlin
the  broader regulatory  and  taxation framework of  the  economy.  Even  in  the  less
centralized systems based on individual retirement accounts, participation may require
compliance with regulations and labor standards unrelated to income security in old-age.
13Where  formal  retirement  security  is  bundled  together  with  unrelated  government
programs and regulations, the costs of compliance to the individual (or small firm) may
be prohibitive.
How contributions are collected under the reformed systems may also affect incentives.
While  in  Chile, the private fund managers are themselves responsible for collecting
contributions from their affiliates, in Argentina contributions are collected by the same
government  authority  that  collects all  other  taxes (see  Table  1). While  "bundling"
collection  of pension contributions together with  other taxes may be efficient in one
respect, it may counteract the positive incentive gains of the reform.  In a related point,
the public cost of a transition from a PAYGO regime to a system of individual retirement
accounts may affect the choices of current workers. As governments struggle to meet the
obligations of the old PAYGO systems without the revenue from contributions of current
workers, the incentives to  tax evasion will be  very high (Corsetti,  1994).  Therefore
despite new incentives after reforms, employment in the informal sector can still imply
substantial savings.  The results presented here indicate that  employers and workers
respond to changes in labor market incentives.  Policy makers must keep this in mind
when designing reforms.
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16Figure  1. Demographic  Trends  in Latin  America, 1975 - 2050 (ECLAC, 1998)
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17Figure 2.  Sector Allocation of Labor Force in Latin America, 1980 - 1997
(ILO, 1998)
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18Figure 3.  Lowering Tax Component of Payroll Contributions  and Impact  on Sector
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19Figure 4a. Contributors to Social Security, Percentage of Economically Active Population
(Data from Colombia may overstate number of contributors)
Argentina  Bdivia  Brazil  CNIe  Cdormbia
8.6 
I
Cc6ta Rica  Dcninican RepLblic  Ecuair  El Salvacbr  Guaternala
8.6 
I
Hni-kras  Janaica  Mexico  Nicaragua  Panana
Parauay  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuel  19B0  1999
689  -
190  1999  10  1999  1980  1999  1980  1999
20Figure  4b.  Social Insurance  Tax (%)
Argentina  Bdivia  Brazil  Ctle  Colombia J_,r  _  I_  _,,  _  l_llll
Costa Rica  Dominican  RepLxik  Ecuador  El Salvador  C3uternab
HorKkiras  Jamaica  Mexico  Nicaragja  Panama
5  I  I  _  _  -__
1980  19
Paraguay  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
46  _  I  I
1980  1999  1980  1999  1980  1999  19B0  1999
21Figure 4b.  Portion  of Social Insurance  Tax Accumulating in Individual Retirement  Account (% of Total Payroll Tax)
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22Figure 5. Payroll Taxes for Social Insurance (Including Health)
in Latin America, 1998
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23Figure  6. Changes in the Share  of Contributors  in the Years Following Introduction
of Individual  Retirement  Accounts
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24Table 1. Principal Features of Reformed Social Security System in Latin America
Chile  Peru  Colombia  Argentina  Uruguay  Mexico  Bolivia  El Salvado
Yearof  refomn  1981  1993  1993  1994  1996  1997  1997  1998
Public  PAYGO  closed  remains  remains  remains  remains  closed  closed  closed
system?
Total  payroll  33  19  17.8  42  41  20  19  11.8
tax  rate,  pre-
reform  (%  of
wage)
Total  payroll  20  24  33.8  46  40  26  24  13.5
tax  rate,  post-
reform  (%  of
wage)
Private  System
Affiliation  of  mandatory  voluntary  voluntary  voluntary  voluntary  a  mandatory  mandatory  mandatorh
new  workers
Fund  AFP  AFP  AFP  AFJP  AFAP  AFORE  AFP  IAFP
managers
Contributon  to  10  8  10  7.5  7.5  6.5  +  10  4.5b
IRA  (%  of  subsidy
wage)
Fees  &  2.94  3.72  3.49  3.45  2.62  4.42  3.00  3.5
Insurance
premia  (%  of
wage)
Measure  of  51  33  30  16  18.5  30  42  33
privatization  e
Fundtransfers  2xp.a. d  2xp.a.  2xp.a.  2xp.a.  2xp.a.  Ixp.a.  2xp.a.  2xp.a.
Minimum  rate  relative  to  unregulated  relative  to  relative  to  absolute  no  nof  relative  to
of  return  on  industry  industry  industry  industry
investment  average  average  average  average
Minimum  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  no  yes
guaranteed
pension
Adapted  from  Queisser  (1998)
Notes:
a)  Participation  in  the  funded  system  in  Uruguay  is  determined  by  income  level
b)  Contribution  rate  will  be  increased  gradually  to  10%
d)  Indicates  workers  can  transfer  their  IRA  to  a different  fund  manager  twice  anually
e)  IRA  contribution  - net  of  fees  and  premia  - as  share  of  total  payroll  tax
f)  Guarantees  required  from  the  fund  managers
25Table 2.  Variables Used in Estimated Contribution Equation
Variable Name  Definition
conteap  share of economically active population contributing to the social security
(pension) system - DEPENDENT VARIABLE
lgdppc  log GNP per capita
a  unemp  difference in rate of open unemployment
lifeexpf  continuous, life expectancy of women at birth 14
femlab  continuous, share of women in the economically active population
sstax  continuous, mandated payroll contributions for all social insurance
(pensions and health)
ira  continuous, share of payroll contributions for all social insurance
accumulating in individual retirement account-  inter-temporal transfer
mandated by the government  but privately administered (denominator:
sstax)
privsys  dummy, 1 if country has a pillar of individual retirement accounts, 0
otherwise
yr  continuous, number of years since the introduction of a pillar of individual
retirement accounts
cyr  interactive, dummy for Chile * "yr" number of years since the
introduction of a pillar of individual retirement accounts
Yt  (t = 80, ... ,  99)  dummy,  1 for each year t in time series from  1980  - 1999
14  We use life expectancy  of women rather than men.  The correlation  coefficients  between  male life
expectancy  and some of the other control  variables  in the model  raises the risk of multicollinearity.  Life
expectancy  of women  is less correlated  with  the control  variables,  but highly  correlated  and significant  at
the 1% level with male life expectancy.
26Table 3.  Contributors to National Social Security System (Share of EAP),
Various Estimations
Pooled OLS  RE  FE
Ignppc  0.035  0.124  0.094
(0.016)**  (0.025)***  (0.033)***
lifeexpf  0.011  0.009  0.007
(0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)**
a  unemp  -0.428  -0.246  -0.263
(0.203)**  (0.072)***  (0.070)***
femlab  0.473  -0.059  0.085
(0.144)***  (0.265)  (0.315)
sstax  0.36  -0.388  -1.189
(0.107)***  (0.217)*  (0.355)***
ira  0.272  0.057  0.153
(0.110)**  (0.064)  (0.076)**
yr  -0.012  -0.025  -0.025
(0.024)  (0.009)***  (0.008)***
yr2 0.002  0.004  0.004
(0.004)  (0.001)***  (0.001)***
yr
3 -0.00009  -0.0001  -0.0002
(0.0001)  (0.000)***  (0.000)***
Year dummies included  yes  yes  yes
Observations  a)  287  287  287
Number of countries a)  18  18  18
R-squared  0.53  0.29  0.31
(within)  (within)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant  at  10% level;  ** significant  at 5% level;  ***  significant  at  1% level
a) Colombia removed from the sample - 20 observations dropped
F Test of joint significance of FE,  Ho: OLS accepted
F(17, 241) = 131.50  P > F = 0.0000
Hausman Specification Test,  Ho:  Difference in RE and FE not systematic
2  2 %  (28) = 27.68  P>  = 0.4816
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